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INTRODUCTION 
 
Debates on civil society in Russia often boil down to the questions of which groups can be 
included in this category, which objectives these groups’ participants pursue, and the nature 
of their relationship with the state. This naturally begs the question, what do we mean by 
the idea of civil society in general? Are these organisations aiming to dismantle or merely 
improve the existing socio-political order? Can we cast organisations that receive state 
funding within the civil society category or should we just consider movements that use non-
government sources? Does civil society comprise of mass social mobilisation movements 
only? Would we include individuals who gather to defend a self-seeking single case or 
discuss current economic, political, or societal subjects within civil society or within the 
public sphere? Much of political theory (Habermas 1989; Habermas 1981; Giddens 1991; 
Keane 1988; Cohen and Arato 1992; Edwards 2009; Crossley and Roberts 2004; Ehrenberg 
1999) claims that all of the above outlets can fall under the rubric of civil society. They must 
be bound, however, by a deeply held desire to improve public life and to achieve some 
tangible form of ‘public good’ (Edwards 2009).  
Given the breadth of the concept, as well as the types of activity that could fall into 
this category, civil society may express different views, pursue different objectives and be 
influenced by different parties and factors. Hence, we may distinguish organisations that (1) 
have close links to the state and state-dominated institutions; (2) have links to global civil 
society through foreign funding procured from global business and foreign states; (3) 
grassroots organisations that do not have particularly close links to either of the above 
parties. The nature of the third, grassroots segment of civil society in contemporary Russia, 
will be the matter of interest to this essay.  
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THEORETICAL REMARKS 
 
Reflecting on the particularities of the evolution of the grassroots civil society sector, we 
may suggest that it is impossible to disassociate its development from the country’s political 
culture. The latter determines an essential set of values, beliefs, and patterns of political and 
socio-economic behaviour in each given society, as well as an essential toolset of reactive 
instruments to particular situations and challenges of the time (Almond and Verba 1963; 
Alexander 2000; Swidler 1986). Political philosophy substantiates this suggestion. Indeed, 
each theory of civil society implies that civil society is endogenous to grassroots level of 
community and culture.   
The pre-Hegelian, or Lockean intellectual tradition, claims that civil society 
represents the highest moment of civilising a community that moves to organise its socio-
economic relationships in institutional forms of self-regulation (Keane 1988, pp. 35-9; 
Seligman 1992, p. 22). The Scottish Enlightenment School defends a similar thesis within the 
economic segment of social functioning also seeing its origins at the grassroots economic 
family level (Keane 1988; Pelczynski 1984; Ehrenberg 1999). The Hegelian model of civil 
society lodges this institution partly within the family and partly within the state, thus 
assuming its rootedness within the local community (Keane 1988, pp. 52–53; Pelczynski 
1984, p. 11; Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 91–102). Finally, the Marxian model, insists that civil 
society ripens within the dominated classes and aims to uproot the existing order with a 
variable set of methods and instruments (Bobbio 1988).  
In each model we speak about networks, organisations, and movements that grow 
from within the depth of people’s consciousness. On this basis, we may infer that each state 
would have its own pattern of civil society, contingent on the nature and essence of its 
political culture. Hence, whenever we look at social movements and outlets of civic activity, 
in particular those operating at grassroots levels and those that do not receive funding from 
the state or foreign agents, we have to investigate the social climate prevalent in the 
country, as well as the deeply held values and aspirations shared by the majority of the 
population.  
 
THE NEW RUSSIAN PATRIOTISM 
 
Reflecting on contemporary Russia, political extremes of the 1990s led the country to 
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experience a collapse of her previously stable state and economic structures as well as the 
obliteration of her pre-existing identities and values. Loss of civic responsibility, decline in 
social solidarity, the emergence of a kaleidoscopic quilt blanket of norms, values, and ideas, 
lack of interpersonal and institutional trust challenged the majority of Russians in the wake 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union.1 This contrasted with economic revival, rising living 
standards, and the consolidation of Russia’s positions in the international arena during the 
decade of 2000s. The new political climate of the 2000s triggered a paradigm shift and 
launched a qualitatively new conservative and state-centred dynamic.2 This was seen in the 
public desire to move towards the political centre and the need to gain distance from the 
political and socio-economic radicalism of the right, left or liberal nature.3  
Opinion poll agencies clearly register this public mood. Recent polls conducted by 
the Levada Center, Russia’s leading liberal opinion poll agency, indicate that the vast 
majority of Russians would not want to leave the country. Only 11 per cent of the 2015 poll 
respondents claimed that they would like to leave, while 81 per cent insisted that they 
prefer to live and work in Russia.4 This contrasts dramatically with the feelings of previous 
decades when large numbers of Russians wanted to settle in the West, which was reflected 
in significant waves of migration among Russia’s professionals, scientists, and business 
persons. A large number of Russian students attending prestigious universities, such as 
Moscow State University, the Moscow Institute for International Relations, and the Moscow 
Higher School of Economics, believe that, by 2030, Russia will be one of the leading 
                                                        
1 ‘Kak zhivesh, Rossiya?’ The Moscow Institute for Socio-political Research RAN, November 2001, 
available at www.ispr.ru/SOCOPROS/socopros300.html, last accessed 27 October 2015. 
2 ‘Sotsiolog Karin Clement o Novom Rossiiskom Patriotizme: Liudi Pocuvstvovali Gordost za Svoyu 
Stranu,’ RFI, 21 October 2014, available at http://ru.rfi.fr/rossiya/20141020-sotsiolog-karin-kleman-o-
novom-rossiiskom-patriotizme-lyudi-pochuvstvovali-gordost-, last accessed 21 November 2015. 
3  ‘Formirovanie srednego klassa v Rossii,’ wciom.ru, 22 August 2008, available at 
wciom.ru/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10562.htm/?no-cache=1&cHash=eol0491f38, last 
accessed 27 October 2015; Maleva, T. and Ovcharova, L., ‘Srednie klassy v Rossii i ikh okruzhenie na 
etape ekonomicheskogo rosta,’ Independent Institute of Social Policy, published in Demoscope 
Weekly, 15-30 June 2009.  
4 ‘Opros: Rossiyane ne Khotyat Zhit I Rabotat na Zapade,’ gazeta.ru, 14 October 2015, available at 
http://www.gazeta.ru/lifestyle/news/2015/10/14/n_7771109.shtml, last accessed 22 October 2015. 
 6 
countries in the world. 5  It is not our task to give a normative assessment to this 
phenomenon. Yet, at the time of writing (autumn 2015), the Russian public experienced a 
feeling of dignity for living in a once again strong and sovereign country.  
These factors create an atmosphere of civic optimism and trust, which could, 
according to political theory studies, form foundations for viable civic activity in the future 
(Uslaner 2002, p. 97; Uslaner 1999; Putnam 1993; Newton 1999, p. 185; Coleman 1990, p. 
320). It is true that such trust and optimism may fuel movements of a different nature 
including unsavoury nationalistic ones. At the same time, we can suppose that there must 
be scope for genuine democratic networks that could transform the picture of civic life in 
Russia. At the moment, such movements could develop in three possible directions. The first 
group of movements is geared towards practical, local, single-issues. The second category is 
focused on Russia’s social issues and state welfare policies on a nationwide scale. The third 
group of movements is concerned with political matters and is mainly supportive of Russia’s 
geopolitical objectives. Many such foreign policy movements are rather nationalistic albeit in 
a civic or civilizational, rather than ethnic, dimension. In what follows I will discuss each 
segment in detail.  
SINGLE CASE MOVEMENTS 
Single case associations are concerned primarily with one particular issue relevant to a 
particular community. They do not task themselves with wider political matters and usually 
dissolve upon the achievement (or otherwise) of desirable results. These are contrasted with 
policy-bound movements, which on the other hand, focus on broad ideological themes and 
campaign for a wide range of issues within a given policy area. They usually function on a 
cross-regional network principle. Such movements strive to change the modus operandi of 
differing political structures responsible for multifarious societal problems. A similar 
classification is made between local and national movements. While the former focus on 
narrow problems of a particular locality, the latter stand for wider policy oriented national 
matters (Rootes 1999; Dobson and Bell 2006; Dean 2001; Gabrielson 2008).  
Commentators in Russia widely perceive single case movements as inferior to their 
nationwide policy-bound counterparts. In this light, Russian grassroots civil society is often 
blamed for being represented by local networks, lacking a nation-wide political dimension                                                         
5 'My Uzhe Nachinaem Vozvyshatsia i My Vozvysimsya Okonchatelno,’ gazeta.ru, 12 October 2015, 
available at http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2015/10/09_a_7812347.shtml, last accessed 22 
October 2015. 
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(Levashev 2006, Clement, Gontmakher, Klimov 2008, Mirasova 2008; MIS RAN 2010; 
Clement 2006). Similar to their Western counterparts, Russia's single case movements 
usually focus on local issues, such as the preservation of the local environment, resisting 
building and communication projects in particular localities, and tackling corruption at the 
municipal level. Yet, having originated in local areas with specific problems, some 
movements begin to co-operate with nation-wide networks concerned with similar issues 
and go beyond their initial narrowly targeted scope. Of particular importance are ecological 
movements related to preservation of local parks, forests, and cities’ green zones. 
Campaigning against various forms of construction that could impede the quality of the local 
environment has become commonplace. In many cases, these movements unite with 
nation-wide and even international ecological networks. In some cases they co-operate with 
regional and federal authorities in an attempt to seek justice against municipal authorities.  
The Moscow Region is the most recent example of the latter case. A number of local 
(city, town, and village) authorities deployed corrupt schemes involving the classification of 
local forests as shrubbery zones and subsequently selling them to big business for building 
and construction. Residents of nearby villages were painfully aware of this corrupt scheme 
and united in small village defence groups with the view to preserve their green zones and 
achieve justice. This led the newly elected governor of the Moscow region, Andrey 
Volorbyev, to respond by ordering random inspections of various local authorities and 
opening a specific hotline, which compiled evidence of land theft and deforestation. We 
cannot claim that the initiative managed to resolve the problem once and for all, given that 
such corruption schemes keep attracting media attention.6 Yet, public attention helped 
saving some local forests and fields as well as somewhat restraining mass corruption in this 
sphere.  
On a general note, single-issue forms of activity are not idiosyncratic to Russia and 
cannot be held against Russia’s civic movements tasked with self-seeking particularistic 
goals. Movements that focus on single-issues and local activity defending particular, rather 
than universal, problems usually represent a norm of political activity in the late modern and 
post-modern eras. Indeed, those paradigms see a significant change from the politics of 
mass emancipation – characteristic of the early modern and modern eras – towards politics 
of self-actualization that are focused on the resolution of professional, life-style, gender and 
environmental matters (Giddens 1991). Many authors argue that, in advanced post-                                                        
6  Alexei Pushkov, PostScriptum, 24 October 2015, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4TCqEvZJSdA. 
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industrial societies, civic movements ‘emerge only in limited areas, for limited phases, and 
by means of moments of mobilisation’ (Melucci 1998, p. 248; see also Lane 1974, pp. 175-8; 
Schwartz 1973; Sloam 2007). Moreover, it is usually claimed that the change in such 
societies does not occur on a large scale, but rather takes place subtly in the ‘invisible realm 
of social consciousness’ (Havel 1989, p. 397). This gives us hope that the accumulation of 
single-issue civic activity in Russia could change the picture of socio-political and state-
society relations in general. 
CIVIC ACTIONS WHICH CONCERN THE WELFARE STATE  
Welfare state grounded civic activity has been on the rise since 2005 when the decision to 
monetise state benefits launched a significant wave of social protests. Grassroots civic 
movements, focused on various welfare problems, have been successfully operating across 
Russia since that time and their number multiplied and the scope of activity broadened. The 
activity of this segment corresponds with pre-existing values and expectations that have 
been deeply rooted in the Soviet political culture. Then the state took responsibility for the 
wellbeing of its subjects and had an overly inflated apparatus for free education, healthcare, 
recreation facilities, as well as accommodation and retirement programmes. From that point 
of view, Russian people find it easy to unite around welfare state causes and demand some 
restoration of pre-existing state obligations.  
Movements and rallies with social demands have become quite common in Russia. 
Workers’ movements are of particular importance. Workers of different occupations unite 
into nation-wide professional trade union networks independent from the state and from 
the state-run Federation of Russia’s Independent Trade Unions (FNPR) that tends to side 
with employers and big business in the resolution of conflicts. Many such independent 
professional associations have been burgeoning across Russia throughout the decade of 
2000s, and in some cases local authorities sided with those associations in defence of 
workers’ rights.7 Of particular significance are Teachers Associations, as well as associations                                                         
7 One recent example of such co-operation took place in the Timashevo poultry factory in the Rostov 
region. The local prosecution office supported the factory workers demands and closely cooperated 
with Inter-regional Working Association (Mezhregionalnaya Rabochaya Assotsiatsiya) representing 
those workers interests. See ‘Timashevskaya Ptitsefabrika: Stanet li Investor Otvetstvennym 
Rabotodatelem?’ Website of the all-Russian Union of Catering and Agricultural Sector Workers, 12 
August 2015, available at http://www.iuf.ru/1/1744.html, last accessed 26 October 2015. 
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related to agricultural, catering, automobile, logistic, and furniture manufacturing sectors. 
Strikes are an interesting theme in this context. Most workers strike in demand of a 
fairer approach to their labour rights. Many recent strikes and protests saw employees 
claiming more comprehensive retirement packages, improvements of rules and regulations 
related to annual leave, a transparent approach to repayment of overtime hours, and 
improved legal protection of the right of workers to campaign for their demands.8 This 
contrasts with previous demands related to the mere repayment of wages, which took place 
during the 1990s, as well as the demands of the early 2000s that have been related to salary 
increases (Kozina 2009, pp. 19-20).  
Pensioners and other categories of vulnerable and welfare state dependent citizens 
campaigned for their rights at the regional level, where local authorities failed to fulfil their 
social obligations or adopted measures that have been adverse to the interests of those 
citizens. July 2015 saw the Moscow region’s pensioners campaigning against the decision of 
the Moscow city government to abolish free travel in Moscow for the region’s residents.9 In 
a number of cities in the Northern Arkhangelsk region, parents campaigned against the 
decision of local authorities to reduce child benefits and against the decision of some 
authorities to abolish housing benefits for those who had work merit awards in the state 
sector.10 Similar decisions by the authorities of the Rostov region led to a long period of 
regional political instability with activists demanding the resignation of the government of 
the Russian Federation.11  
At the same time, I must mention that left-wing oriented observers should not feel 
overly optimistic. The general climate of political conservatism in Russia plays a significant 
role (Clement et al. 2010). Apart from the fact that welfare and social protection movements 
often obtain a conservative angle such as the one pursued by the pro-family All-Russian                                                         
8 ‘Pedagogi Vyshli na Piket k Minobrnauki nakanune Dnia Uchitelia,’ Institut Kollektivnogo Deistviya, 2 
October 2015, available at http://ikd.ru/node/19501, last accessed 24 October 2015. 
9 ‘Zhiteli Podmoskovya Provodyat Mitingi Protiv Otmeny Lgot Pensioneram,’ regnum.ru, 22 July 2015, 
available at http://regnum.ru/news/society/1945166.html, last accessed 24 October 2015. 
10 ‘Zhiteli Arkhangelskoi Oblasti Boryutsia za Sokhranenie Sotsialnykh Lgot i Detskikh Posobii,’ Institut 
Kollektivnogo Deistviya, 19 November 2013, available at http://ikd.ru/node/19274, last accessed 24 
October 2015. 
11  ‘Zhiteli Zverevo k Svoim Trebovaniyam Dobavili Trebovanie Otstavki Pravitelstva,’ Institut 
Kollektivnogo Deistviya, 6 August 2013, available at http://ikd.ru/node/19182, last accessed 24 
October 2015.  
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Parents Resistance movement,12 most Russians are not prepared to convert their social 
demands into political statements and, by doing so, change the nature of the extant political 
regime. They are reluctant to support persons and organisations whose goal is to overthrow 
Vladimir Putin, seize power on the back of social slogans, and ultimately pursue a neo-liberal 
agenda similar to the one implemented during the 1990s. 13  Hence, participation in 
campaigns defending social welfare is, at times, slowed down due to the fact that most 
Russian neo-liberals began appropriating the social welfare agenda with the view of 
converting its cause to specific regime-changing objectives.14  
CIVIC ACTION WITH FOREIGN POLICY AIMS 
Following the onset of the Ukrainian 2014 Maidan crisis, many ordinary Russians, as well as 
political and foreign policy movements campaigned in support of the ethnic Russian 
population in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. They hoped to defend the ability of those people 
to freely use their language in educational and state institutions, to cherish their national 
culture and to enjoy state-building myths focused mainly on the events of the Great Patriotic 
War (1941-45). Rallies in support of Crimea have been of an unprecedented scale. Initially 
originating in Moscow, these actions quickly spread nationwide attracting thousands of 
participants in Siberia, the south of the country, the Far East, and the Urals. The first 
Moscow rally, which took place on 6 March 2014, witnessed as many as thirty thousand 
participants, while the number of partakers in subsequent gatherings climbed well over one 
hundred thousand.15                                                          
12 The group aims to prevent Russia from adopting juvenile justice patterns practiced in most 
countries of Western Europe, as well as family laws related to child rearing practices advocated in 
those countries. In particular, they are outspoken against the abolition of the terms ‘mother’ and 
‘father’ and their replacements ‘parent A’ and ‘parent B’. These activists fear that tightening 
legislation on domestic violence could give the state a carte blanche to remove children from poor, 
but functional families, and transfer them to public care. 
13 The fate of the Khimki forest movement is an example. Once large, active, and prominent, the 
movement had gradually subsided, partly because its most prominent leader Yevgeniya Chirikova 
adopted a radically liberal Western-focused political agenda that began diverging from the city 
interests and the initial goals of the movement. This effectively sealed the fate of the network as a 
nation-wide ecological organisation, making it a small liberal interests club (Clement 2011). 
14 Ryzhkov, Gozman, Nadezhdin in Solovyev and Babayan. 
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The surge of civic enthusiasm was seen in the significant increase in Vladimir Putin’s 
public approval rating, which rose to 76.2 per cent in March 2014, climbing further to 82.2 
per cent in April, and reaching 86.2 per cent in May 2014.16 It is important that there was no 
support of Russia’s direct military involvement in the Ukrainian crisis as such, for many 
movements’ participants were against the war. Opinion polls taken between March and 
August 2014 consistently indicated that nearly two thirds of Russians were against 
deployment of the Russian Army in Ukraine, despite being supportive of the Russian 
population in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.17  
The oppositional view to Russia’s action in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine was also 
present albeit it was less prevalent. Liberal activists organised Marches for Peace, in which 
they supported the Ukrainian Maidan movement and disagreed with Kremlin policies 
towards Crimea. Even though liberals were a minority within Russian society, the 15 March 
2015 protest gathered as many as 15,000 participants.18 However, it is also important that a 
silent understanding of Russia’s point of view was present even in those gatherings. Many of 
those who took part in the 2014 protests in defence of Ukrainian statehood felt, according 
to the Moscow Institute of Collective Action, that the West adopted a one-sided position, 
shifting the blame squarely on the Russian authorities and overlooking some gross 
shortcomings on behalf of the Ukrainian government.19  
The height of the crisis saw a large number of charity organizations collecting                                                                                                                                                               
15 ‘Bolee sta desiati tysiach chelovek prishli na miting v podderzhku Kryma v Moskve,’ Rossiiskaia 
Gazeta, 18 March 2014; see also ‘Moskovskii Miting v Podderzhku Kryma Sobral 50 tyshiach 
chelovek,’ lenta.ru, 7 March 2014, available at http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/07/meeting/, last 
accessed 22 October 2015. 
16  ‘VTsIOM: Reiting Putina Obnovil Maksimum i dostig 89.9,’ RIA Novosti, available at 
http://ria.ru/politics/20151022/1306168855.html#ixzz3pICpHUsv, last accessed 22 October 2015. 
17 ‘Dve Treti Rossiyan – Protiv Vvoda Voisk na Ukrainu,’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 July 2014. It is also 
important that nearly 50 per cent of the VTsIOM respondents refused to boycott Ukrainian goods, 66 
per cent feels that Russia should not deploy military force in Ukraine, and 33 per cent think that this 
should be entirely forbidden.  
18 ‘Marsh Mira v Moskve Protiv Voennogo Vmeshatelstva v Krymu,’ RBC, 15 March 2014, available at 
http://www.rbc.ru/photoreport/15/03/2014/911321.shtml, last accessed 22 October 2015. 
19 ‘Sotsiolog Karin Clement o Novom Rossiiskom Patriotizme: Liudi Pocuvstvovali Gordost za Svoyu 
Stranu,’ RFI, 21 October 2014, available at http://ru.rfi.fr/rossiya/20141020-sotsiolog-karin-kleman-o-
novom-rossiiskom-patriotizme-lyudi-pochuvstvovali-gordost-, last access 21 November 2015. 
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clothing, medicine, and food for those affected by the Donbass warfare.20 These operated 
through various social media networks such as Facebook and V Kontakte, churches, city 
Councils, telephone hot-lines, medium and small business outlets, and extensive diaspora 
networks. Volunteers and local businesses contributed towards expenses related to 
temporary accommodation shelters for refugees across Russia. A large number of Russian 
families accommodated refugees in their homes’ spare bedrooms. In the course of one year 
of military tension between 2014 and 2015, Russia accepted over one million refugees from 
Eastern Ukraine, and grassroots civic activity played a large role in supporting the state in 
this endeavour.21 Liberal activists also took part. They established various human rights 
research groups that struggle for the rights of Ukrainian migrants with the view to improve 
their socio-economic positions within the Russian society.22 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, developing civil society at a grassroots level is a long and thorny process. 
While assistance from external sources, such as the state or foreign agency can somewhat 
help the cause, genuine civil society is to grow from within local communities. It requires, as 
Robert Dahl (1989) noted, a critical mass of active and civically minded citizens. Hence, a 
particular climate of political-cultural social relationships has to be formed within the 
country. This socio-political climate has to reflect particular problems of the state in 
question. It has to respond to the specific needs of the citizens. It has to rely on the 
atmosphere of social trust and solidarity. These aspects cannot be created exogenously but 
have to develop gradually on the basis of experience, history, local culture, and local 
demands. From that point of view, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (2009) was 
right to claim that ‘Russia’s democracy will not copy foreign patterns automatically. Civil 
society cannot be bought with foreign grants. Mimicking customs of advanced Western 
societies cannot reshape our political culture’. Yet, gradual evolution of grassroots 
movements that reflect the problems of Russian society gives observers a positive hope for                                                         
20 ‘Goryachyaya LiniyaPomoshchi Bezhentsam,’ available at https://pombezh.ru/pub/hotline, last 
access 22 October 2015. 
21 ‘Issledovanie RBK: Skolko Rossiya Tratit na Ukrainskikh Bezhentsev,’ RBK, 22 June 2015, available at 
http://www.rbc.ru/special/society/22/06/2015/5575e79e9a79473a63e39b35, last accessed 22 
October 2015. 
22  ‘Migranty s Ukrainy Begut v Evropu,’ gazeta.ru, 28 October 2015, available at 
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/10/28_a_7849775.shtml, last accessed 30 October 2015. 
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the future of civic activity in this country. Surely, this will not happen overnight but with 
patience, accumulation of practice, and a gradual building of trust between the state and 
society, this goal does not seem to be out of reach. 
*** 
Dr. Elena Chebankova is the author of Civil Society in Putin’s Russia, 2015 (London: 
Routledge, 2015). 
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